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NEOLIBERALISM IN U.S. FAMILY LAW:
NEGATIVE LIBERTY AND LAISSEZFAIRE MARKETS IN THE MINIMAL
STATE
ANNE L. ALSTOTT*
I
INTRODUCTION
Neoliberalism permeates U.S. family law. The law protects negative liberty
in family life but denies positive rights to the resources that make family life
possible. The law endorses laissez-faire market outcomes and portrays the state
as overbearing and incompetent.
Even seemingly progressive landmarks in family law remain within the
neoliberal frame. Loving v. Virginia, Lawrence v. Texas, and United States v.
Windsor, for instance, mark true victories for social progressives, protecting
1
important rights long denied to persecuted groups. And yet, none of them
challenges in any deep way the three core ideals of neoliberal family law:
negative liberty, laissez-faire market distributions and the minimal state. To
take another example, the earned income tax credit (EITC) passes in today’s
United States for a progressive welfare program, even though it alleviates only
2
modestly the harshness of laissez-faire labor markets.
In this article, I document how neoliberalism dominates U.S. family law in
three legal arenas. The first is federal constitutional law, where the Supreme
Court has adopted a thoroughly neoliberal vision of the family. According to
the Court, the Federal Constitution grants individuals wide latitude to assert
negative liberty—that is, freedom from state intervention—in family life. But
individuals have no constitutional right to claim any distribution of resources
other than that produced by the marketplace. So strong is the Court’s ideal of
negative liberty, and so extreme is its skepticism about state power, that it has
insulated the state from any responsibility to protect children—even against
vicious and foreseeable parental attacks.
The second legal arena is state family law, which pursues a limited mission
Copyright © 2014 by Anne L. Alstott.
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1. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. See infra text at notes 83–91; Anne L. Alstott, Why the EITC Doesn’t Make Work Pay, 73 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 285 (Winter 2010) [hereinafter Alstott, EITC].

ALSTOTT_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX_EIC

26

(DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2015 12:35 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 77:25

shaped by the contours of constitutional law. When individuals have sweeping
rights to negative liberty but no rights at all to challenge market distributions,
the primary task of subconstitutional law is simply to create legal space for
individuals to exercise negative liberty. Accordingly, state family law pursues no
broad mandate to foster family life. Rather, it seeks only to authorize private
ordering and to adjudicate private disputes. Even in the parent–child
relationship, neoliberalism dominates, as state law leaves children’s fates to
depend on their parents’ market earnings. Rich children prosper and poor ones
suffer, and neither children nor their parents can seek legal redress.
The third legal arena is federal and state welfare law. One might suppose
that welfare would provide a legal vehicle for citizens to challenge market
outcomes. However, in the United States today, welfare provision tends to
ratify market distributions rather than upend them. Absent constitutional rights
to aid, welfare programs exist at the sufferance of political actors, and the
programs’ terms reflect neoliberal commitments. So, for instance, the major
U.S. social insurance programs privilege paid employment by granting benefits
that reward high earnings and steady participation in the workforce. And
welfare programs often feature time limits, work requirements, and other
conditions that ensure that poor individuals and their families subsist primarily
on their market earnings. The predictable consequence is that individuals and
families can suffer dire poverty without any entitlement to state assistance.
The entrenched neoliberalism of family law is frustrating for many reasons,
not least because it blocks sustained consideration of a more appealing
liberalism. Negative liberty, as important as it is, is insufficient for justice. We
can imagine—indeed, other countries have adopted—constitutional
interpretations that convey positive rights. We can also imagine—and, again,
other countries have enacted—law that looks beyond the minimalist task of
settling private disputes and instead aims to correct market distributions and
promote a family life open to all.
But so thorough is the neoliberal cast of U.S. family law at all levels that it is
difficult to create legal space for consideration of such ideas. Today,
constitutional law, family law, and social welfare represent separate legal
3
specialties. To engage the possibilities of liberalism, a necessary, though hardly
sufficient, first step will be to draw connections across bodies of law that are,
today, treated as separate fields.
II
NEGATIVE LIBERTY AND THE MINIMAL STATE IN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL
FAMILY LAW
Neoliberalism is a slippery term, and as David Grewal and Jed Purdy
4
discuss, it takes plural forms in legal discourse. In family law, three neoliberal
3. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
4. See generally David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77
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ideals dominate both constitutional and subconstitutional law: negative liberty,
market distribution, and the minimal state.
According to the Supreme Court, individual liberty in family life begins and
ends with negative liberty—the absence of state intervention in the family.
Every major constitutional right in family law that has been recognized by the
Supreme Court sounds in negative liberty. In Loving, the Court famously
invalidated a state ban on interracial marriage, holding that the freedom to
5
marry “resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State.” More
recently, in Windsor, the Court struck down the provisions of the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) that denied federal recognition to state marriages
between individuals of the same sex, holding that DOMA amounted to an
6
unconstitutional denial of liberty guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. To be
sure, Loving and Windsor invoked other constitutional considerations,
including the prohibition on racial classifications (in Loving) and the historic
deference of the federal government to the states in matters of domestic
relations (in Windsor). But both decisions invoked individuals’ claim to
negative liberty in choosing marital partners.
Reproductive rights cases have also reflected the constitutional allegiance to
negative liberty. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a state law
7
imposing criminal penalties on the use of birth control, while in Roe v. Wade,
8
the Court invalidated some state restrictions on abortion. In both cases, the
Court protected negative liberty, framed as “zones of privacy” in Griswold and
9
“rights of personal privacy” in Roe. Today, reproductive rights remain
contested, with social conservatives scoring some victories limiting access to
10
abortion, but the key rights protected by the Constitution are rights to act free
of government interference.
The Supreme Court has extended negative liberty to sexual activity as well.
In Lawrence, the Court struck down a Texas statute criminalizing sexual acts
11
between persons of the same sex. The Court admonished that “[t]he
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot
demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual
12
conduct a crime.”
Despite these negative rights against the state, individuals have no positive

LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 1.
5. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)
(invalidating a Wisconsin statute prohibiting marriage by individuals owing child support).
6. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2695–96 (2013).
7. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Id. at 152; Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
10. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (imposing an “undue
burden” test for abortion restrictions and upholding some Pennsylvania regulations while striking down
others).
11. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
12. Id. at 578.
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rights at all to the resources they need to conduct family life. Families have no
13
constitutional right to cash welfare, to housing, or to education, for instance. In
federal constitutional parlance, welfare, taxation, and other distributive policies
face only “rational basis” review, meaning that they are essentially beyond
14
constitutional challenge. Poverty is not a suspect classification triggering
15
constitutional scrutiny. Thus, for instance, states can cap welfare benefits
16
17
regardless of family size, can refuse to build public housing projects, and can
18
fund public schools inadequately (or, apparently, not at all). The United States
19
can constitutionally limit welfare benefits to five years, deny Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly Food Stamps) benefits to a
20
household if a parent fails to pursue employment, and deny welfare benefits to
21
children based on parental behavior.
The Supreme Court’s rejection of a positive right to state support reflects
the second neoliberal ideal that dominates U.S. family law: the primacy of
resource allocations produced by laissez-faire markets. When the Court denies
welfare rights, it endorses market outcomes and rejects the notion that
individuals are entitled to basic resources (or any resources at all) other than
those earned in the marketplace.
In Dandridge v. Williams, for instance, the Court permitted Maryland to cap
welfare benefits to larger familes, based on the state’s interest in encouraging
employment in the marketplace at prevailing wages:
By [limiting the welfare grant and permitting the recipient to retain her market
earnings] . . . Maryland provides an incentive to seek gainful employment. And by
keying [welfare grants] to the minimum wage. . .the State maintains some semblance
of an equitable balance between families on welfare and those supported by an

13. For recent scholarship noting the absence of welfare rights in the U.S. Constitution, see Mario
L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in Constitutional
Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109 (Fall 2009); William E. Forbath, Social Rights, Courts,
and Constitutional Democracy: Poverty and Welfare Rights in the United States, 12 DEMOCRATIZATION
725 (2005).
14. See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (upholding a state welfare law denying
extra benefits to larger families); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state
minimum-wage law for women). For rare federal constitutional victories in rational-basis cases, see
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (striking down a Texas statute denying public-education funds for
undocumented immigrants); U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (invalidating Food
Stamp Act provision denying benefits to households with unrelated persons).
15. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 323 (1980).
16. Dandridge, 379 U.S. 471.
17. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding the constitutionality of a California law
requiring that public housing projects be approved by referendum).
18. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (“Education, of course, is
not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any
basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”). If a state chooses to provide public education, however, it
may face constitutional mandates to provide it equitably. See Plyler, 457 U.S. 202 (striking down a
Texas statute denying public-education funding for undocumented immigrants).
19. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2006) (five-year time limit).
20. 7 U.S.C § 2015(d)(1) (2006 & Supp. 2008) (work requirements for SNAP).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e) (2006) (states may terminate benefits for parental refusal to work, with
limited exceptions).
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22

A legal reader might recall that the 1960s and 1970s fostered a vigorous
welfare-rights movement that won landmark cases in the Supreme Court. Cases
23
24
including King v. Smith and Rosado v. Wyman did mark victories for welfare
recipients over state authorities seeking to enforce moral restrictions and cut
benefits. But these were statutory victories, not constitutional ones. The repeal
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1986 and its
replacement with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) marked
the death of these statutory victories: by design, TANF is not an individual
entitlement but a block grant to the states that requires time limits and work
restrictions. TANF contains no open-ended mandate (as AFDC arguably did)
25
for the state to support impoverished children and families.
26
Even the widely celebrated 1970 constitutional case Goldberg v. Kelly did
not establish a constitutional right to welfare. The Supreme Court deployed
sweeping language in its opinion: “From its founding the Nation’s basic
commitment has been to foster the dignity and well-being of all persons within
its borders. We have come to recognize that forces not within the control of the
27
poor contribute to their poverty.” But the Court guaranteed only the limited
28
procedural right to a fair hearing before the termination of welfare benefits.
Similarly, the Supreme Court later held that states cannot deny access to the
courts to indigent parties seeking a divorce solely because of an inability to pay
29
30
court costs. However, despite possessing this “right to be heard,” nothing in
the Constitution guarantees state support to indigent divorced individuals or
their children.
Together, the neoliberal ideals of negative liberty and market distribution
create an asymmetric pattern of federal constitutional protections for family
life. Individuals have fundamental rights to marry, engage in sexual activity, and
otherwise carry on family life, but their legal rights enable them only to fend off
state regulation. Individuals have no right to the resources they need to marry,
to divorce, or even to remain alive (a rather obvious prerequisite to family
31
life). Every individual is expected to support herself and her spouse on what
she can earn in the labor market. And she has no recourse if the market prices
22. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486 (1970).
23. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (invalidating an Alabama rule denying welfare benefits to a
family with a “substitute father”).
24. Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (striking down a state rule that cut benefits to some
families in New York State).
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 601 (providing that the purpose of TANF is to “increase the flexibility of the
states” in offering welfare to families and providing that the statute must not be interpreted “to entitle
any individual or family to assistance under any State program”).
26. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
27. Id. at 264–65.
28. Id. at 270–71.
29. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
30. Id. at 377.
31. See Druker v. Commissioner, 697 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1982).
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of basic necessities are beyond her reach. The absence of positive rights to
income or to sustenance impose de facto limits on citizens’ access to marriage
and family life, but these limitations are invisible in federal constiutional law.
Constitutional cases on parental rights dance the same neoliberal two-step.
Parents have near-absolute rights to rear their children as they choose, but the
law protects only negative liberties. The Supreme Court has invalidated a
32
number of state regulations, including compulsory-education laws and
33
grandparent-visitation mandates, on the ground that they infringe parental
liberty. State “interference” with parents is tolerated only when parents put
34
children in danger of physical harm.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, for instance, the Supreme Court stuck down a
statute requiring children to attend public school as:
unreasonably interfer[ing] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the
upbringing and education of children . . . . The child is not the mere creature of the
State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the
35
high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.

Although some legal fashions of the 1920s went out of style rather quickly in
the New Deal, negative liberty for parents withstood the test of time and has
remained central to federal constitutional jurisprudence, as confirmed by the
Court in 2000 in Troxel v. Granville. In Troxel, the Court invalidated a
Washington state statute that mandated visitation rights for grandparents
(among others) over parental objection: “The liberty interest at issue in this
case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized
36
by this Court.”
At the same time, parenthood, like other family activities, confers no
positive rights to the resources needed to rear children. Families have no right
to welfare and no constitutional hook to challenge the adequacy of their wages
or living standard. Even education is optional from a federal constitutional
perspective, according to the Supreme Court: “Education, of course, is not
among the rights afforded explicit protection under our Federal Constitution.

32. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (rejecting state mandate that children attend
high school); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (sustaining parents’ authority to enroll
children in private schools, defying a state mandate for public education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923) (sustaining parents’ rights to educate their children in a language other than English).
33. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). Courts permit the states to limit parental authority
only when serious physical harm to the child is highly likely. See generally WALTER WADLINGTON &
RAYMOND C. O’BRIEN, FAMILY LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 121–24, (2d ed. 2007) (discussing the evolution
of the law on parental authority to decline medical treatment).
34. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–70 (1944) (upholding application of labor
laws to child distributing religious materials on the street, because the situation “may and at times does
create situations difficult enough for adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for children,
especially of tender years, to face,” and “[o]ther harmful possibilities could be stated, of emotional
excitement and psychological or physical injury”).
35. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
36. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
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Nor do we find any basis for saying it is implicitly so protected.”
The Federal Constitution, then, paints parenthood in neoliberal colors:
parents may rear their children (mostly) as they like but must support them out
of their own earnings and have no claim to state support. Indeed, so strong is
the Supreme Court’s endorsement of market outcomes that the Court has
approved draconian measures, including jail time, for parents who fail to
38
support their children out of their own earnings. States routinely impose
sanctions for child-support nonpayment, including wage withholding and the
39
denial of state licenses, even when payors are indigent.
To be sure, the Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhail famously invalidated
one sanction on nonpayment of child support. In that 1978 case, the Court
40
struck down a Wisconsin statute that denied the “fundamental” right to marry.
But Zablocki has come to seem outdated in light of recent, more aggressive
sanctions upheld by the judiciary. For instance, a state court in 2001 upheld
against a federal constitutional challenge a probation condition that prohibited
41
a “deadbeat dad” from having more children. The court in that case reasoned
that the father in question could regain his constitutionally protected right to
procreate simply by paying what he owed (a tall order, given the defendant’s
42
nine existing children and years of arrears in child support).
The third neoliberal ideal endorses a minimal state, an aspiration that
permeates the constitutional canon in family law. Negative-liberty cases often
highlight the dangers of the overreaching state. In Lawrence v. Texas, for
instance, the Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the majority may use
the power of the State to enforce [moral views opposing homosexuality] on the
43
whole society through operation of the criminal law.” The overreaching state
also appears as the villain in parental-rights cases. In Troxel, for instance, the
Supreme Court held that “the Due Process Clause does not permit a State to
infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make child rearing decisions
44
simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made.” And
the Court worried that interactions with the state, even to enforce a wellintentioned rule, could be toxic to family life: “[T]he burden of litigating a
domestic relations proceeding can itself be ‘so disruptive of the parent-child
37. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
38. See WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 144–45 (discussing federal legislation that
imposes criminal penalties on parents who fail to pay child support). As the authors note, there is a
Commerce Clause question about the federal government’s constitutional powers to act in this arena;
there is not, however, any constitutional question that the states may do so.
39. See id. at 146. See also Eunique v. Powell, 302 F.3d 971, 974 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding against
constitutional challenge a rule denying a passport to a mother who had failed to pay child support on
the grounds that “the failure of parents to support their children is recognized by our society as a
serious offense against morals and welfare”).
40. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
41. State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 447 (Wis. 2001).
42. Id. at 473–75.
43. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571 (2003).
44. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72–73 (2000).
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relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain
45
basic determinations for the child’s welfare becomes implicated.’
The ideal of the minimal state played a heartbreaking role in the tragedy of
Joshua Deshaney. Four-year-old Joshua was nearly beaten to death by his
father, who had a history of abusing the child. But the Supreme Court held that
the state had no constitutional obligation to protect the child:
The [Due Process] Clause is phrased as a limitation on the State’s power to act, not as
a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security; it forbids the State itself to
deprive individuals of life, liberty, and property without “due process of law,” but its
language cannot fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation46on the State to
ensure that those interests do not come to harm through other means.”

The three neoliberal ideals are, of course, intertwined. The minimal state is
deeply consistent with negative liberty and distribution via laissez-faire markets.
The state’s implicit role is to facilitate market transactions by protecting
property rights. Beyond that, the state need not take any particular actions to
promote family life, protect children, or mitigate the poverty, distress, and
isolation produced by free markets.
These propositions are so thoroughly familiar in U.S. law that it may be
difficult to imagine what else might be done. But, in fact, it would be entirely
possible for the United States, like other constitutional democracies, to protect
welfare rights and other positive liberties and harmonize them with U.S.
47
48
institutions. Scholars including Frank Michelman, Lawrence Sager, and
49
Goodwin Liu have explored in detail a variety of avenues for incorporating
positive rights into U.S. constitutional law.
III
PRIVATE ORDER AND PRIVATE TRAGEDIES IN SUBCONSTITUTIONAL FAMILY
LAW
The three neoliberal ideals—negative liberty, market distributions and the
minimal state—also shape subconstitutional family law. State family law
nominally prescribes the duties associated with marriage, divorce, and
parenthood. But a closer look reveals that the law privileges private ordering
45. Id. at 75.
46. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989) (dismissing a
Section 1983 claim against the Wisconsin social services agency that failed to intervene despite the
known threat posed by the father to the son).
47. For work exploring constitutional grounds for welfare rights, see Frank I. Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U. L. Q. 659 (1979); Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuit
of Constitutional Welfare Rights: One View of Rawls’ Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962 (1973);
Frank I. Michelman, Foreword, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 7 (1969).
48. LAWRENCE SAGER, JUSTICE IN PLAINCLOTHES 95–102 (2004) (arguing that the Constitution
confers a right to minimum welfare, which should be respected by Congress and the President, even if
underenforced by the judiciary).
49. Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J. 330, 334 (2006)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment should be interpreted to confer a right to a “meaningful floor
of educational opportunity”).

ALSTOTT_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX_EIC

No. 4 2014]

(DO NOT DELETE)

1/9/2015 12:35 AM

NEOLIBERALISM IN U.S. FAMILY LAW

33

and deploys state power only to resolve private disputes.
The result is that family law is one of the most depressing courses in law
school. Failed marriages, dysfunctional parents, and neglected children sprawl
across a thousand pages in a typical family-law casebook. Most of the stories
sound a familiar theme: When individuals destroy their lives and their families,
they must bear the consequences, and there is little or nothing the state can do
to help. But these narratives rest on the neoliberal architecture of constitutional
and subconstitutional family law. When the law privileges private ordering and
provides individuals with no right to challenge market outcomes, individuals
and their families bear the brunt of bad luck as well as bad choices.
The law of marriage nicely illustrates how state prescriptions lay only a thin
veneer over the expectation that private ordering will govern. The states
50
regulate entry into marriage, banning incest and polygamy. But spouses in an
ongoing marriage have very few cognizable legal claims against each other, and
51
52
none against the state. The canonical case is McGuire v. McGuire, in which a
Nebraska wife sued her husband, asking the court to require him to pay for a
variety of ordinary expenses, including furniture, a car with a working heater,
and travel expenses to visit her daughters. Mr. McGuire apparently had plenty
of money but refused to pay for these items or to permit his wife to charge them
to his account.
State law imposes a duty of support on parties to a marriage, and the legal
53
duty was quite clear in McGuire. But the court held that the law conclusively
presumes the duty of support to be met unless the spouses are separated or
filing for divorce:
The living standards of a family are a matter of concern to the household, and not for
the courts to determine . . . . As long as the home is maintained and the parties are
living as husband and wife it may be said that the husband is legally supporting his
54
wife . . . .

Thus, what appears to be a legal mandate (to support one’s spouse) is
nothing more than a delegation to engage in private ordering. Mrs. McGuire, it
55
turns out, cannot invoke the law’s authority to challenge her standard of living.
Consistent with the minimal state, the primary exception to the state’s non-

50. See WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 21–29.
51. See generally Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 225 (2011) (noting that the states typically do not enforce bargains between spouses prior to
separation or divorce).
52. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953).
53. See id. at 339–40 (reviewing past decisions supporting the proposition that spouses owe a duty
of support to one another).
54. Id. at 342.
55. See Case, supra note 51, at 227 (noting that states adopting the Uniform Act “do not seem to
enforce such contracts, and some have seemingly inconsistent statutory provisions”). Case considers
whether, as a normative matter, the law ought to permit explicit bargains between spouses, and she
notes that even the McGuire case (which did not involve an explicit contract) might be consistent with
such an interpretation. She acknowledges, however, that the dominant interpretation of the positive
law today is otherwise.
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involvement in ongoing marriages involves violence and severe harm: the state
may “intervene” in cases of spousal rape and other torts committed against a
56
spouse.
Divorce might seem to offer an entry point for legal intervention into a
57
couple’s affairs. But even when divorcing spouses insist on their day in court,
the substantive law privileges negative liberty and market allocations. No-fault
divorce, now available in every state, permits marriages to dissolve for any
reason, including no reason at all (provided, typically, that the spouses live
separately for some period). Thus, the state declines to “intervene” even in the
divorce decision—no matter how vulnerable one of the parties may be or how
58
disastrous divorce may prove.
Along similar lines, statutory law provides rules for property division,
spousal support, and child custody. But the rules rarely challenge private
decisionmaking and market distributions. For instance, the formal law of
property division in most states calls for the equitable division of marital (or
59
community) property. That rule might seem to authorize the courts to
intervene heavily in the affairs of a divorcing couple, making fine judgments
about merit and need. But de jure, the law excludes many classes of assets from
60
property division, including future earnings from professional degrees. And,
de facto, the law can only divide what the parties own. With the exception of
the very rich, there is often little to divide, and so there is little room to play
even the zero-sum game the law contemplates. In 2010, the median family had
61
net worth (assets less debt) of just $77,300. Even that figure overstates the
financial position of many Americans. Among families headed by an individual
62
under the age of thirty-five, for example, median net worth in 2010 was $9,300.
Twenty-five percent of Americans in 2010 had negligible or negative net
63
worth. And most family assets are illiquid and not easily divisible: more than
64
half of family wealth in 2010 was held in the form of equity in homes and cars.
65
Although data on divorce settlements are scarce, it appears that, in the vast
56. See generally CLARE DALTON & ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE
LAW (2001); Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1375 (2000).
57. Indeed, the court in McGuire implies as much. See McGuire, 59 N.W.2d at 342 (“As long as the
home is maintained and the parties are living as husband and wife . . . ”).
58. See WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 77–78.
59. See HARRY D. KRAUSE & DAVID D. MEYER, FAMILY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 280–85 (4th ed.
2003).
60. See id. at 295.
61. Jesse Bricker et al., Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2007 to 2010: Evidence from the
Survey of Consumer Finances, 98 FED. RES. BULL. 1, 17 tbl.4 (2012).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 18.
64. Id. at 42 tbl.8.
65. See Kiley Morgan, How Ubiquitous are Alimony Awards? A Call for Current Data, 20 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 95, 95 (2011) (“systemic study of the incidence of alimony awards . . . seems
nonexistent for the last 20 years”); Amanda Ruiz, Alimony Awards for Petitioners, 20 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 103, 105 (2011) (referring to the “unavailability of divorce and alimony data . . .”).
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majority of cases, divorced couples part ways with neither owing much, if any,
66
spousal support (alimony) to the other. Private ordering is common, as many
couples seek only a judicial rubber-stamp of a private agreement, and large
67
percentages of divorcing couples forgo lawyers entirely. Mediation programs
further privilege private ordering over judicial inquiry.
The law of divorce, then, has come to privilege private decisionmaking and a
“clean break,” with each party returning to the marketplace to make his way.
Today, the law increasingly expects spouses to hold jobs and to subsist after
68
divorce on their own earnings.
Child-custody doctrine also might seem to invite a role for the active state.
The law, after all, typically requires the courts to consult the “best interests of
69
the child.” One might imagine vigorous court interviews of the parents and the
extended family, perhaps supplemented by reports by social workers and
psychologists, all trying to craft the best placement for the child. One might
even imagine state supports for parents and children after divorce to ensure
that neither financial nor personal stress causes undue harm. But, on the
ground, neoliberal ideals govern instead. Divorce confers no right at all to state
assistance or services, even for children.
In keeping with negative liberty, the law does grant parents strong rights to
custody. A fit parent trumps any nonparent, even when the nonparent might be
a far better caregiver. And, in keeping with the minimal state, the law sets a low
bar for parental “fitness”: a fit parent is simply one who is not abusive or
neglectful. Custody disputes between parents attract state scrutiny, but
contested custody is fairly rare: typically, parents arrive at a negotiated custody
70
arrangement without serious judicial oversight.
Stepping back, the neoliberalism of state family law is striking. Negative
liberty, market distribution, and the minimal state limit the scope of the law,
ruling out of bounds many of the most important questions about families.
Even progressive scholarship in family law, seemingly unencumbered by
neoliberal ideals, mostly occupies the legal space authorized by neoliberalism.
For instance, a key legal issue at divorce is whether the market earnings and
savings of one member of a couple should be redistributed, once or on an
66. See Judith G. McMullen & Debra Oswald, Why Do We Need a Lawyer?: An Empirical Study
of Divorce Cases, 12 J. LAW AND FAM. STUDIES 57 (2010) (finding that alimony was awarded in only
8.6% of cases in a county in Wisconsin 2005, and that most of these awards were temporary or would
terminate upon specified events (e.g. the sale of a house or car). The U.S. Census Bureau reports
alimony awards in 14.6% of divorses. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY:
1985, 14 (1987).
67. See McMullen & Oswald, supra note 66, at 71 (finding that approximately 44% of husbands
and 38% of wives represented themselves in a sample of divorce cases).
68. See generally WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 80–83 (discussing the evolution of
the law on spousal support and concluding that “both spouses are expected to exercise employment
opportunities, diminishing the need for ‘sustenance’ for either”).
69. WADLINGTON & O’BRIEN, supra note 33, at 150.
70. See KRAUSE & MEYER, supra note 59, at 184 (citing a study finding that only 1.5 percent of
divorces involved judicial determination of child custody).
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ongoing basis, to the other. Accepting this frame, the most progressive possible
position is that alimony should be generous in order to implement something
like equal sharing of economic fortune. One might also, on the progressive side,
advocate expanded alimony to take into account women’s traditionally greater
share of child care and the career sacrifices that women make in raising
children. But proposals to increase alimony can only divide the market earnings
and assets of the couple. The hard truth is that alimony makes little practical
difference to many people in the middle class and all of those below it—that is,
those with modest market earnings and very little savings.
So strong are the principles of negative liberty, market distribution, and the
minimal state that there simply is no room in family law, as presently
constituted, to ask important questions about family life, such as:
1. How should society respond if marriage is beyond reach for individuals
with low earnings or with disabilities?
2. How should society act if a couple, married or unmarried, earns so little
that their children lead impoverished lives?
3. How should society respond when a divorce would leave one or both
spouses destitute?
4. How should society respond if divorce would leave children with
insufficient resources to permit them to flourish?
Sadly, these questions are irrelevant to family law in the United States.
Constitutional law forecloses any legal claim to positive rights—to the resources
needed to marry, to procreate, and to grow and develop. And the mission of
subconstitutional law is confined to ensuring that couples and their children
subsist on the resources they earn in the marketplace.
We can now see why family law is a singularly painful subject for study.
Consider two examples of the private tragedies that populate the casebooks and
demonstrate how the neoliberal conventions of family law prevent legal actors
from identifying and addressing the real issues at stake.
71
In re Marriage of Wilson is the case of the brain-damaged wife. Elma and
Tom Wilson married in midlife and divorced after Elma suffered brain damage
that left her unable to work. Tom paid Elma alimony for nearly five years but
then petitioned the court to cease alimony payments. The trial judge, whose
ruling was affirmed on appeal, posed the question as, “‘at what point in time
does the obligation to assist Mrs. Wilson become one of society’s as
distinguished from an obligation that is Mr. Wilson’s,” and concluded, “I find
72
that it is society’s at this point in time.’”
Wilson presents a classic private tragedy. Without alimony from Tom, Elma
was left to subsist on government disability benefits that did not even raise her
73
income to the poverty line. The court noted Elma’s “tragic disability” but

71. In re Marriage of Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. 522 (1988) (Cal. Ct. App.).
72. Id. at 524.
73. See also Anne L. Alstott, Private Tragedies? Family Law as Social Insurance, 4 HARV. L. &
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placed it squarely beyond the state’s responsibility: “The [trial] court recognized
both the grievous and permanent nature of Elma’s disability. It was beyond the
74
court’s power to render her self-supporting.”
The neoliberal cast of family law shines the spotlight on Elma’s actions.
Perhaps she should have thought ahead, saving more money for a rainy day.
Perhaps she should have chosen a more loyal husband. Compounding her bad
luck, her adult daughter and her daughter’s husband moved back home with
75
her, unable to work due to a car accident and unemployment. But perhaps
they, too, should have been more prudent.
The larger point is that a neoliberal court cannot interrogate the state
(because the law does not permit it) about why Elma’s bartending wages were
so low and why her disability insurance entitlements were so meager. Brain
damage is something that might happen to anyone at any time. Legal scholars
76
might at least debate (just as political theorists do ) whether the responsibility
to insure against such calamities should belong to the individual or the state.
But, given the absence of constitutional entitlements and the limited mission of
state family law, such questions are excluded from legal discourse. Elma’s
limited remedy lies against Tom, and she cannot claim any particular assistance
from the state.
Another example of the private tragedies of family law is In Re Eden F.,
which tells the story of a mother with mental illness and her daughter with
77
disabilities. Ann, the mother, had a mental illness that made it difficult to care
for her children. The state offered spotty support, and Ann’s condition waxed
and waned in severity, with the result that Eden and her younger sister were
frequently removed from and then returned to Ann’s care after periods in
foster homes. In a telling detail, the court relates how the state social-services
agency gave Ann a hotline number to call when she felt overwhelmed—a
78
hotline that apparently was unstaffed for days at a time. Partly as a result of
the disrupted living arrangements, Eden developed an attachment disorder and
behavioral and learning disabilities, making her especially difficult to care for.
The court terminated Ann’s parental rights, despite noting that Ann had
“achieved a level of stability within her limitations” and had “sincere love for
79
her daughters.”
The story of Ann and Eden reads like a tragic novel. Poor Ann, doing the
best she can, and poor Eden, who deserved better! But this is law, not
Dostoevsky. Law can—and should—aim to do more than portray the private
POL’Y REV. 3, 8 (2010) [hereinafter Alstott, Private Tragedies] (noting that Elma’s yearly benefits of
$5,232 per year would fall below the then federal poverty threshold of $5,360).
74. Wilson, 247 Cal. Rptr. at 526.
75. Id. at 524.
76. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 312–
40 (2002).
77. 741 A.2d 873 (Conn. 1999).
78. Id. at 897.
79. Id. at 893.
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tragedies of the modern age. Once again, however, the neoliberalism of the law
rules the important issues out of bounds. The holding of the case is that
Connecticut law at that time did not require the state to prove that it had made
reasonable efforts to reunify Ann and Eden. The echoes of DeShaney are clear:
Here, statutory law, like the constitutional law at issue in DeShaney, creates no
affirmative duty for the state to take measures to promote family life or protect
children.
It is impossible to know whether Ann would have been capable of caring for
Eden with greater state support. But the absence of any affirmative state duty
to families and to children silences the critical questions about justice. How
should society anticipate and address the challenges of parenthood for people
with mental illness? What legal remedies should be open to parents and
children when mental illness and developmental disabilities arise?
Just as in Wilson, the structure of state entitlements in Eden F. stands like
Mount Everest, part of the landscape and just as immovable. Ann received the
services the state chose to provide, as did Eden. Strikingly, the incompetence of
the state is both evident and unquestioned: if the hotline went unanswered,
well, what more could have been expected of the bumbling bureaucracy?
Neither Ann nor Eden had any legal claim to more.
In subconstitutional family law, then, negative liberty, market distributions
and the minimal state form an unvarying backdrop. The result is that the cases
repeat the same story line: individuals suffer bad luck or make bad choices, and
they—and their children—must bear the consequences. The law has no duty to
foster family life, to protect children’s development, or to mitigate market
outcomes.
IV
THE MINIMAL WELFARE STATE
It might seem that welfare law is the place to turn to detect the state’s role in
mitigating family tragedy. Perhaps the constrained mission of family law can be
explained by positing a legal division of labor: perhaps the law relegates to the
welfare state the tasks of fostering family life, protecting children’s
development, and mitigating market outcomes.
But, in fact, welfare programs in the United States provide only minimal and
grudging resources for family life. Indeed, the “welfare state” is nearly a
misnomer here: although the term provides a convenient shorthand for a gaggle
of federal and state programs, it is too grandiose to describe the minimal and
80
patchwork protections enacted by the United States. As we have seen, the
United States guarantees aid neither to adults nor to children as a constitutional
matter. Congress and state legislatures have adopted welfare programs, but
these assist only some families in some circumstances. Not everyone in distress

80. See supra part II.
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81

receives adequate (or, indeed, any) public aid.
The United States provides two kinds of assistance: poverty relief and social
insurance. Both are deeply neoliberal in their commitments to market
distribution and to the minimal state. This basic point is well known. For
instance, Gosta Esping-Andersen documents with accuracy the contours of
what he terms the “liberal” welfare states, including the United States. In these
welfare regimes, the laissez-faire market is idealized and poverty is attributed to
individual failings:
The general assumption in liberalism is that the market is emancipatory, the best
possible shell for self-reliance and industriousness. Private life may be wrought with
insecurity, danger, and pitfalls; and poverty or helplessness is in principle not unlikely
to occur. Yet this is not the fault of82 the system but solely a consequence of an
individual’s lack of foresight and thrift.

A brief summary suffices to show how the U.S. welfare state tracks
neoliberal principles. Social insurance, payable only to claimants with a
substantial on-the-books work record, accounts for the bulk of federal dollars
spent on the welfare state. In 2012, for instance, Social Security cash benefits
cost the federal government $773 billion, or about five times the $155 billion
spent on cash and cash-like benefits in the major means-tested programs—
83
SNAP, TANF, and the EITC.
Social Security illustrates the dual nature of social-welfare initiatives in the
(neo)liberal state: the program mitigates market allocations but also reinforces
them. On the one hand, Social Security provides cash benefits when old age,
disability, or the death of a family member disrupts family economic
arrangements. Moreover, benefits are calculated so that low (lifetime) earners
receive a disproportionately high “return” on their payroll taxes.
On the other hand, Social Security ratifies and valorizes market
distributions. Benefits are payable only to workers with a substantial history of
market employment in on-the-books jobs. The program thus excludes many
marginal workers, gray-market workers, and individuals engaged in care work.
Further, the program pays higher (absolute) benefits to individuals with higher
wages and longer work histories, enhancing their already-greater market
84
security. And the program assesses its taxes in a regressive pattern, taxing the
85
first dollars of wages of low earners while exempting high wages entirely.
A separate program of unemployment insurance follows the same pattern.
Unemployment Insurance (UI) pays benefits to the unemployed, but only to

81. This theme is explored in detail in JOEL F. HANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, BLAME
WELFARE; IGNORE POVERTY AND INEQUALITY (2007).
82. GOSTA ESPING-ANDERSSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM 42 (1990).
83. Historical
Tables,
Office
of
Mgmt.
&
Budget,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals (Table 11.3) (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
84. For a summary of benefits calculation, see Social Security Benefit Amounts, SOC. SEC. ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/Benefits.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2014).
85. 26 U.S.C. § 3101.
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workers with a demonstrated history of on-the-books employment. And
benefits track market wages, with the lowest payouts to the lowest earners. A
time limit on benefits (variable by state and by the state of the economy) limits
the program’s impact on market outcomes.
Means-tested programs in the United States display the same two
tendencies, but with a sharper edge: they temporarily mitigate market outcomes
but push recipients as quickly as possible back into the marketplace. The major
means-tested programs—TANF, the EITC, and SNAP—are intended to
alleviate dire distress for limited periods and not to drive a permanent wedge
between parents’ earnings and children’s living standards.
Thus, TANF pays sub–poverty level benefits and imposes work
87
88
requirements and a time limit. SNAP includes work requirements. The EITC,
although permanent, provides only a modest wage supplement to workers with
a significant market presence. Indeed, EITC benefits rise proportionally with
89
market earnings up to (roughly) the poverty level and decline thereafter.
90
Commentators sometimes praise the EITC for its antipoverty effect, but that
effect depends critically on the fact that the U.S. poverty thresholds are set well
below the cost of decent food, housing, and other necessities. In fact, the EITC
lifts families out of (officially-measured) poverty, but it does not lift them to a
decent living standard. Instead, the program aids committed market workers by
91
mildly mitigating the distress of living on very low wages.
Notably, the United States has no catchall or residual program for families
or even children who fall through the gaping holes in the safety net. With no
federal constitutional mandate for welfare, the fifty states determine their own
welfare commitments, and many states either have no general assistance
program, or provide small benefits, often only to those deemed unable to
92
work. In recent years, general assistance has “weakened considerably . . .
93
despite the large increase in need resulting from the recession.”
Medical care represents an evolving and contested exception to the
neoliberalism of the U.S. welfare state. The Affordable Care Act (ACA)

86. For an overview of the UI program, see THEODORE R. MARMOR, JERRY L. MASHAW, AND
JOHN PAKUTKA, SOCIAL INSURANCE: AMERICA’S NEGLECTED HERITAGE AND CONTESTED
FUTURE 139–43 (2013).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2006) (five-year time limit); 42 U.S.C. § 607 (work requirements).
88. 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d), 2015(o) (work requirements).
89. 26 U.S.C. § 32.
90. See, e.g, Chuck Marr, Commentary: One Anti-Poverty Initiative Both Sides Can Agree On,
CENTER
ON
BUDGET
AND
POLICY
PRIORITIES
(Jan.
24,
2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/cms/index.cfm?fa=view&id=4079.
91. Alstott, EITC, supra note 2.
92. LIZ SCHOTT & CLAIRE CHO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y PRIORITIES, GENERAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS: SAFETY NET WEAKENING DESPITE INCREASED NEED 1 (2011), available at
http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-26-11pov.pdf.
93. Id. In 2011, thirty states had general assistance programs, while twenty had none. Of those
states with GA programs, only twelve provided benefits to “employable” adults (i.e., those with no
disability). Id.
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incorporates neoliberal elements by continuing the tax exemption and other
94
privileges of market workers with middle-class jobs. The ACA also ratifies
market distribution by relying on private-market provision of insurance and
partial private financing. Still, the ACA awards public subsidies intended to
expand health insurance for poor people and low-wage workers previously
unable to afford or obtain insurance. As of this writing, the political battle over
the ACA continues, and it remains to be seen whether the ACA will mark a
new era of universal provision or, instead, a partial (and possibly failed) attempt
to insulate health insurance from market distributions.
Public education might also seem to mark an exception to the neoliberal
commitments of the U.S. welfare state: despite the apparent absence of a
federal constitutional entitlement, states do guarantee children a free, public
education. But the appearance of equality masks the well-known and long95
tolerated inequalities in public education. Racial inequalities remain, despite
decades of remediation, and class inequalities are severe. The system de facto
links the quality of education to market distribution: the children of the well-off
and the middle-class receive better educations, whether they be public or
96
private, than do the children of the poor.
V
CONCLUSION
Taken together, constitutional law, subconstitutional family law, and the
U.S. welfare state enact a distinctly neoliberal legal regime for the governance
of family life. What is striking is that these three bodies of law are so seldom
analyzed together. Constitutional law, family law, and social welfare represent
distinct legal specialties. U.S. constitutionalists work within a regime in which
negative liberty is powerful and positive liberty seldom mentioned. Family-law
scholars work within a system of rules that permits only zero-sum allocations of
market earnings within private families. And social-welfare specialists take as
given the absence of constitutional rights and the political contingency of social
programs.
I am certainly as guilty as anyone of this separate-spheres thinking. I have
written often about families, equality, and social welfare and have never written
a word about constitutional law (except to contemplate whether the
97
Constitution prohibits wealth taxation). I have written about family law and
94. See 26 U.S.C. § 106 (excluding from federal taxable income employer contributions for health
insurance).
95. For a recent discussion of national educational inequality, see Liu, supra note 49.
96. For evidence of disparate funding, see More Than 40% of Low-Income Schools Don’t Get a
Fair Share of State and Local Funds, Department of Education Research Finds, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.
(Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/more-40-low-income-schools-dont-get-fairshare-state-and-local-funds-department-.
97. See, e.g., ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE CHILDREN AND WHAT
SOCIETY OWES PARENTS (2004); BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER
SOCIETY (1999).
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equal opportunity—surely a constitutional subject if not one recognized in U.S.
constitutional law—and, once again, in those contexts, I have not explicitly
98
addressed constitutional law because it has seemed so irrelevant. I have even
written about the disconnect between social welfare and the “private tragedies”
of ordinary family law, again without attempting to invoke in any affirmative
99
way the U.S. Constitution.
Compounding the strangeness of these legal separations, I have often
proposed large-scale, egalitarian reforms ($80,000 for every young person;
annual grants to parents; intensive education, health care, and talent
100
development for children). And yet (wait for it), it did not occur to me to
constitutionalize any of these proposals. I simply ruled the constitutional
possibilities out of bounds without much thought.
But when positive constitutional rights become impractical and
unmentionable, the damage filters all the way down. States and individuals lack
any legal means to assert positive rights or to challenge market outcomes. The
absence of these rights impoverishes family law, which is reduced to
adjudicating individuals’ claims against each other—and limited to
redistributing the parties’ market earnings between them. Lacking a
constitutional entitlement, social welfare degenerates into a purely political
game, with entitlements rooted in inertia and in interest-group configurations
rather than in any commitment to equality. These patterns become entrenched
in professional and academic life: they become foundational rather than
contingent.
I am not making the simple—and probably false—claim that constitutional
litigation can lead the project of challenging the neoliberalism built into
American family law. The same politics that lead Congress to hew to neoliberal
norms in social welfare policy are at work in Supreme Court appointments and
decisions and in the states as they enact and interpret subconstitutional family
law. So I do not suppose that the project of challenging neoliberalism can or
does begin in the Supreme Court or via litigation.
I do think, however, that those who worry that neoliberalism is foreclosing a
more egalitarian and attractive liberalism should insist on making connections
across bodies of law, and that has been my aim here.

98. See Anne L. Alstott, Is the Family At Odds With Equality? The Legal Implications of Equality
for Children, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (2008).
99. Alstott, Private Tragedies, supra note 73.
100. ACKERMAN & ALSTOTT, supra note 97 (grants to parents); Alstott, supra note 98 (extensive
investments in children’s development).

